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Abstract
The reviewed monograph deserves the attention of both legal historians and constitutionalists, since 
it deals with the forming of European constitutionalism on the three levels: doctrinal, historical and 
comparative. Sovereignty of the nation was a fundamental principle of European constitutionalism 
and parliamentarism. The presented description of the process of juridifi cation of national sovereignty 
based on the Polish, Spanish, Belgian and Italian constitutional models, considerably broadened the re-
search fi eld to be exploited by those interested in the origins of the European constitutional experience, 
both that of permanent and ephemeral nature. This experience makes up a common tradition refl ective 
of the European constitutional pattern which in the present-day Europe is referred to as the “state of 
law” (Rechtsstaat).
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Statute of 1848
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The reviewed monograph presents the achievements of the research team that came to 
being under the guidance of principal investigator professor Ulrike Müßig (Chair of 
Civil Law, German and European Legal History, University of Passau) within the frame 
of the Advanced Grant as awarded by the European Research Council. The publication is 
composed of  two parts. The fi rst part contains the essay by U. Müßig who is the principal 
investigator of the grant. In this essay the authoress presented the assumptions, goal and 
methodology of the research project entitled: “Reconsidering Constitutional Formation 
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(ReConFort). Constitutional Communication by Drafting, Practice and Interpretation in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe”.1 After a short description of the program of 
studies on the European constitutionalism the authoress passed on to analyse the early 
European constitutions. She did it from the perspective of the concept of sovereignty of 
nation as the major source of the emergence of the constitutions and as the main idea 
round which the constitutional discussion was centred. The question of sovereignty of 
the nation as found in the European constitutions of the 18th and 19th centuries was out-
lined in the introductory part of the volume, and was developed in its second part. The 
latter includes three detailed contributions devoted to the following selected constitu-
tions: the Belgian of 1831, the Albertinian Statute of the Kingdom of Sardinia, and the 
Polish Constitution of 1791.
The monograph discussed in the present review should arouse particular interest of 
legal historians since the research project of U. Müßig, which was awarded an Advanced 
Grant by the European Research Council, tries to shed a new light on the process of 
forming European constitutionalism. Let us ask: what does the original approach of the 
ReConFort-Project toward the history of European constitutionalism consist in?
Firstly, the authoress of the Project suggests the reconsidering of the European consti-
tutional formation. To carry out this task she selected the examples of fi ve Constitutions, 
and specifi cally: the Polish one of 1791, the Spanish Constitution of Cadiz (1812), the 
Belgian one of 1831, the Albertinian Statute of 1848 and the Frankfurt Constitution of 
1849. The point is that previously the attention of legal historians was focused mostly 
on the sources of English, American or French constitutionalism. The analysis of consti-
tutional debates that preluded the emergence of the aforementioned constitutions might 
contribute to the arrival at a more complementary image of the history of European con-
stitutionalism. Also the depicting of the birth of constitutional system in the geographic 
and time-based space diff erent from the one with which the previous research has been 
concerned, is certainly a considerable merit of the reviewed publication.
Secondly, the ReConFort project exploited a concept of broader understanding of the 
Constitution which was defi ned as “an evolutionary achievement of the interplay of the 
constitutional text with its contemporary societal context, with the political practice and 
with the respective constitutional interpretation”. With so dynamic approach toward to 
the Constitution the text of the latter full achieves its signifi cance only when the social 
circumstances of the appearance of this text, as well as the political debate and the con-
stitutional practice are taken into consideration. The researcher is therefore required to 
resort to the varied source material, including the documents illustrative of legislative 
work of the law-creating assemblies, alternative projects, the opinions articulated in the 
professional journals and in political publicism, and also in the correspondence produced 
both by the supports and opponents of the constitutional changes. This kind of method-
ological  approach toward the study of the origin of constitutionalism is doubtless an 
innovatory one, but makes up  also a great challenge which may be sometimes diffi  cult 
to meet since the sources and materials are considerably dispersed.
1  U. Müssig, Reconsidering Constitutional Formation: Research Challenges of Comparative Constitu-
tional History, “Giornale di Storia Constitutionale” 2014, no. 27 (1), p. 107–108.
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Thirdly, the ReConFort project prefers the problems-, and not the complex-oriented 
description of the selected fi ve European constitutions. The description is expected to be 
made throughout prism of four criteria: (1) Constituent Sovereignty/National Sovereignty 
(the reviewed volume is devoted to this question); (2) Precedence of Constitution (this 
is question designed to be elaborated in the next volume),2; (3) Judiciary as Constituted 
Power; (4) Justiciability of Politics. 
While conducting their research on the course that was taken by the constitutional 
discussion, the participants in the project focus their attention on the idea of sovereignty, 
primacy of the Constitution, separation of powers and guarantees of the independence of 
the judiciary. These are the issues that the project participants are planning to incorporate 
into the synchronous and diachronic comparative formula. The comparative common 
ground is expected to be formed, on one hand, by conveying the discussed ideas on to 
the provisions of the Constitution (juridifi cation by Constitution). On the other hand – in 
case of the Constitutions whose binding force is continued for longer time – the  com-
parative aspect is expected to be determined both by their functioning in practice as well 
as by their interpretation. The ambitious research plan of the ReConFort-Project was 
partly materialized by the present monograph which provides the reader with the fi rst 
opportunity to assess its results.
One should share the view of the authoress presented in her introductory essay. She 
claims that the comparative criterion of the concept of sovereignty of the nation must go 
beyond the lexical layer. The point is that one and the same terminology contains diff er-
ent content. The notion of the sovereignty of the nation as conceived of by the Polish no-
bility diff ers from that conceived of by the Spanish Cortes in the Constitution adopted by 
their members in Cadiz in 1812. The only linking element detectable in the approach ad-
opted toward the sovereignty of the nation and found in Poland, Spain, France, Belgium 
may be the fact that in each of these countries the idea of the sovereignty of the nation 
was a political fi at of the constitutional model of state power. The authoress understands 
the Constitution as a legal codifi cation needed to fi x the political order as a legal order. 
Due to this she considers the mode by which the sovereignty of the nation, as a political 
category, becomes refl ected in the provisions of the Constitution – to be tertia compara-
tionis. From the point of view of the authoress the assessment of the process of juridifi -
cation of sovereignty by Constitution determines the comparative scale applicable to the 
Constitutions selected for the research.
The implementation of any idea and introducing it into the legal order requires how-
ever a thorough defi nition of this idea. The reconstruction of the designations of the 
principle of sovereignty of nation obviously draws the attention of the researcher to the 
French thought of political and constitutional nature because this thought laid the foun-
dations for the birth of European constitutionalism. It is true that some states legitimated 
a new political order by means of the will of the nation. By doing this they exploited their 
own experience and doctrine. In case of the Polish Nobiliary Republic this was the idea 
of nobiliary republicanism, in Spain – that would be the doctrine of the law of nature as 
2  At the University of Passau, in 19–21.09.2016 there was held a seminar in which the ReConFort team 
participated. At this seminar there were presented the results of research on the principle of superiority of 
Constitution. The discussed results will be presented in the second volume that is being elaborated by the 
participants in the project.
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promoted by the school of Salamanca. Nevertheless the  French debate that took place 
at the time of revolutionary passing from absolutism to constitutionalism, almost every-
where left its stamp on the understanding of the sovereignty of the nation conceived of 
as the source of limiting royal power. It seems justifi ed therefore to recall the French ap-
proach to the sovereignty of the nation (people) as an indispensable guide to the descrip-
tion of how the sovereignty was adapted in the respective Constitutions.
One should also agree with the authoress that the appearance, in the 18th century, of 
the public life, unhampered by censorship, was of signifi cant character for the disputes 
on the constitutional shape of the state. A free parliamentary debate, development of the 
press, the possibility of publishing casual printed materials, all these made up a space 
within which there was possible the development of the free exchange of opinions. One 
may even claim that the European constitutionalism stems from two ideas that indis-
solubly grew into one: the written constitution and the freedom of speech and press. In 
Europa that was abandoning absolutism these two political values functioned as an indis-
pensable safeguard of the emancipation of burghers. On the other hand in the Republic of 
the Two Nations (Poland–Lithuania) freedom of speech was the foundation of the repub-
lican system. It was the basic element of political freedom of nobility and the instrument 
that from the 16th century on allowed to control state power.3 The reminder about the 
leading role played by the Polish legislation in protection of the freedom of speech is in-
dispensable in this place since the authoress illustrates the progress of the contemporary 
public debate and presents the manner in which the American revolution was perceived 
in the Polish constitutional debate. 
The distinguishing of the Polish constitutional debate form that point of view is on 
all accounts justifi ed. In the Polish Nobiliary Republic the heart of political struggle was 
indeed a sharp dispute between the supporters and opponents of the concept of hereditary 
monarchy. This was the question that absorbed the greatest attention of publicism of the 
Four-Year Seym era. From the point of view of patriotic camp the hereditary monarchy 
was a safeguard of freedom and independence of the state while from the perspective 
of the magnate-supported camp – such monarchy would be tantamount to the loss of 
freedom, to the tyranny and despotism. The publicism of the time, while searching for 
the arguments for each of these two perspectives, used to invoke American revolution. 
Some publicists perceived the freedom- and independence-emphasizing tones of the lat-
3  The Seym – adopted law of 1775 proclaimed: “The citizen’s freedom […] consists exactly in potentia 
sentiendi et dicendi. It is improper to impose a ban on or to rid of this gift allowed by God. Therefore while 
complying with the law of 1669 […] nobody […] even if at the public meetings can be brought to account-
ability before the courts”. The fi rm Cardinal Laws of 28 January of 1791, in their Article XI, confi rmed this 
protection of the freedom of speech. They proclaimed: “Also a free utterance, even if not made at public meet-
ings and also the freedom of expressing one’s thought or opinion, whether in written form or in print, when 
supplied with a signature, is guaranteed to be made without any approval […] but is subject to accountability 
before the Court if someone with a written or printed piece exhorted to rebellion or if he infl icted a harm on 
the reputation of his neighbour”. According to the law of 1791 that was passsed on the basis of the Constitu-
tion of 3rd May 1791 the Commission of the Police was to see to it “that freedom of writing and printing be un-
disturbed”. On this see A. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Dyskusja o wolności słowa w czasach stanisławowskich, 
“Kwartalnik Historyczny” 1995, vol. 102, no. 1, p. 53ff ; and also A. Dziadzio, Polski model „rządów prawa” 
a europejska wizja „państwa prawa” w XIX wieku [in:] Państwo prawa i prawo karne. Księga jubileuszowa 
Profesora Andrzeja Zolla, vol. 1, Kraków 2012, p. 143.
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ter while others emphasized those aspect of American revolution which confi rmed their 
anti-monarchical and republican concepts.
The authoress successfully documents the clash between two major constitutional 
images as detectable in the publicistic discussion. Simultaneously she depicts an ex-
traordinary intellectual broad-mindedness of the Polish political elites on both sides of 
the political confl ict. The signifi cance of the Polish republican thought – as invoked 
in the introduction to the volume – for the legitimizing of the limited position of the 
King as formulated in the Constitution, was fully confi rmed in the contribution by Anna 
Tarnowska on The sovereignty issue in the public discussion in the era of the Polish 3rd 
May Constitution (1788–1792). It is from the presented analysis of the Polish discourse 
on the sovereignty of the nation that it may be found that this discourse was not an 
ideological dispute referring to the substance of the sovereignty since sovereignty of the 
nobiliary nation was incorporated into the constitutional system of the Republic as early 
as the 16th century. These were the nobles who still remained the original sovereign. The 
sovereign power of the king was always derivative of the will of nobiliary nation which 
would elect their king by free election viritim (i.e. by the entirety of the nobles).4 What 
remained a key question in this discussion could be boiled down to the problem: how 
to most fully secure the sovereign power of the nation in the Constitution in the sense 
that the nation be externally independent and internally enjoying political freedom. All 
participants in the debate of the time considered it indisputable that the supreme legisla-
tive power of the nation was vested in the representatives of the nation or the Seym con-
ceived of as the “temple of the law-creation power”. Creating laws was obviously one of 
the pillars of the nobiliary freedom according to the principle “nihil de nobis sine nobis”. 
This was the axiom of the nobiliary world outlook which took it for granted that the su-
perior role in the 3rd May Constitution of 1791 fell to the Seym. This “omnipotence” of 
the Seym was legitimized by the will of the sovereign nation, this will being expressed 
by the representatives of the latter. The power of the king, in its turn, had its source in the 
Constitution. The legitimizing of this power was therefore of normative nature.
For these reasons the political struggle in Poland focussed on the question of whether 
the throne was expected to be hereditary or not, and on the scope of the royal power. 
What inevitably resulted from this struggle was a considerable limitation of royal power. 
This limitation had to be imposed in order to override the nobiliary dogma referring to 
the hereditary monarchy which was regarded as a direct road leading to the absolut-
ism and consequently to the loss of freedom. In her interesting and multi-aspect study, 
A. Tarnowska is right when, while making concluding remarks on the nature of the 
Polish constitutionalizing of the sovereignty of the nation, she invokes a characteristic 
quotation selected from the writings of one of the participants in the Polish constitutional 
debate. According to its author, who was a supporter of constitutional reforms, the com-
ponent of the true freedom was not made up by the election of the king but by the power 
of the nation based on the Constitution, the one which describes “royal power with rea-
sonable provision”, guarantees the rights of man, vests legislative power in the hands 
4  In the Diary of the Seym held in 1592 it may be found that the nobles considered themselves to be the 
exclusive sovereign. This confi rmed by the line in which they stated that: “Each of us is the heir of this king-
dom in which we elect a king who is expected to command us in accordance with law”. D. Pietrzyk-Reeves, 
Kontynuacja i zmiany w polskim republikanizmie XVII i XVIII wieku,  CPH, 2015, vol. 67, no. 1, p. 45.
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of the representatives of the nation and entrusts the executive power to the magistracies 
elected by parliament.
In the era of Great Seym (1788–1792) the concept of preponderance of sovereignty of 
the nation became a dominant idea. No wonder therefore that in the Nobiliary Republic’s 
Constitution of 1791 the sovereignty of the nation became safeguarded by the legislative 
power of the House of Deputies (the Senate disposed only of the suspending veto while 
the King lost his right to give assent to the bills passed in the Seym) and by the account-
ability of ministers before the Seym both in the political as well as in the constitutional 
sense. The King lost his independent position in matters of internal policy since he was 
the one who “doing nothing by himself” needed a countersignature (an endorsement) on 
his acts as made by the appropriate minister. By countersigning the King’s decisions it 
was the minister, and not the monarch, who could be brought to accountability before 
the Seym. The laws that were later passed in order the implement the provisions of the 
Constitution delimited the scope of activities of the State authorities, thereby guaranty-
ing  basic civic rights of an individual including even his right to privacy, this being left 
unmentioned in both the American and French list of fundamental civic rights.5
Without such an open public discussion that took part in the Nobiliary Republic over 
the assumptions of the future Constitution it would not be possible to override the resis-
tance of the majority of the nobles toward the idea of hereditary monarchy. This was only 
the adoption of the 3rd May Constitution in 1791 that induced the numerous defendants 
of the free election of the monarch to reconcile with the constitutional change. By doing 
this they assumed that “any constitution that was willed by the nation was good”.6 The 
support given to the constitution by its earlier adversaries became possible due, among 
others, to the fact that the dominant position of the Seym vis-à-vis the royal power was, 
in a way, an identifi cation sign of fundamental assumptions of the 3rd May Constitution. 
Ulrike Müßig considers this distinguishing feature of the Polish 18th century constitu-
tionalism to be a manifestation of juridifi cation of the sovereignty of the nation whose 
emanation was exactly the existence of the political and constitutional responsibility of 
the ministers before the Seym, as well as a limited scope of royal power. One should 
on principle agree with such approach of the authoress toward the Polish understand-
ing of the constitutional signifi cance of sovereignty of the nation.7 What might comple-
5  Cf. A. Dziadzio, Polnische Version des Rechtsstaates vom Ende des 18 Jahrhunderts (System des Ver-
fassungsrechts 1791) [in:] Parliaments: The law, the Practice and the Representations: From the Middle Ages 
to the Present Day, eds. M.H. de Cruz Coelho, M.M. Tavares Ribeiro, Lisbon 2010, p. 112. The fact that in the 
3rd May Constitution of 1791 the declaration of basic civic rights is absent does not deprive it of the status of 
the constitutional document that introduced an early model of “Rechtsstaat”. By way of comparison we may 
emphasize that the Constitution of a the Second German Empire of 1871 is considered to be an example of 
“Rechtsstaat” despite the fact that it did not contain any list of civic rights of an individual. The point is that 
the citizens were granted their basic rights in the laws that were passed in ordinary way. 
6  Cf. R. Lis, Między Konstytucją 3 maja a Targowicą. Poglądy polskich republikantów w latach 1791–
1793, CPH, 2012, vol. 64, no. 2, p.161ff . These lines were written by Adam Wawrzyniec Rzewuski. He was 
the nephew of Field Hetman Seweryn Rzewuski whose opinion against the hereditary throne was, by Febru-
ary 1792, rejected by the majoriy of Seymiks. 
7  However one cannot share the opinion of the authoress that the political responsibility of ministers in 
the Polish Constitution resembles the American impeachment. The point is that the procedure of dismissal of 
the minister as provided for by Art.7 of the 3rd May Constitution referred exclusively to the situation when the 
acts of the minister, which were fully within the boundaries of law, were not supported by the Seym and fell 
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ment this picture would be the fact that the King indeed exercised the governmental 
power through the ministers whom he nominated but the administration was vested in 
the hands of Great Commissions nominated by the Seym. The ministers who together 
with the King composed the “Guard of Law” did not dispose of their own departments 
but performed their management through the collegial organs that were dependent on the 
Seym. This dualism in the organization of the executive power (“the government” that 
was dependent on the King and the “administration” which was subjected to the Seym) 
was the next guarantee securing the position of the sovereign Seym and excluding the 
development of the King’s personal rule. 
The parliamentary governmental system was not the only thing that diff erentiated the 
Polish constitutional model from that of the United States or that of France. The author-
ess emphasized that the Polish Constitution was the only one which expressis verbis 
declared the superior position of the Constitution and assumed that all laws passed by 
the Seym should be consistent with it. Without speculating in advance on the potential 
conclusions of the ReConFort research team about the forming of the principle of the 
primacy of the Constitution (since this is the subject to which a separate publication – 
vol. II,8 will be devoted) it seems advisable to refl ect on what laid the foundations for 
this peculiarity of Polish Constitution. The ideological groundwork for the acceptance in 
the 3rd May Constitution of the idea that the latter is superior in relation to ordinary laws 
lay, it seems, in the attachment of the Polish nobles to the concept of fi rm cardinal laws 
viewed as a guarantee of nobiliary liberties. Within the canon of nobiliary outlook upon 
the state there functioned the conviction that anyone who at any time exercised power 
at the top agency was bound by the cardinal laws as an upper rank of law order. It was 
therefore not accidental that the adoption of the 3rd May Constitution was preceded by 
the passing of the “fi rm cardinal laws”.9
short of the latter’s expectations. The law on the Seyms defi ned this procedure as a “vote-of-no confi dence”. 
The American model of the presidential government consists exactly in this that it lacks this form of responsi-
bility of the representatives of the executive to the legislative body. In the 3rd May Constitution the ministers, 
irrespective of their political responsibility, could be also brought to accountability for “any crimes”, i.e. they 
were constitutionally (penal) responsible, this responsibility applying both to the person and to the property 
of the minister. This kind of the responsibility may be juxtaposed only with the American impeachment. 
On that see K. Baran, Procedure in Polish-Lithuanian Parliaments from Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, 
“Parliaments, Estates and Representation” 2002, vol. 22, ed. H.J. Cohn, Published by ASHGATE for the In-
ternational Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions, p. 69. What I would 
also consider to be e defect is the absence in the text of the original names of the discussed institutions as well 
as the lack of uniform principles in translating them into English. For example “Izba Poselska” of the Polish 
Parliament is translated in one place as “the Messenger’s Chamber” but in some other place as “the House of 
Representatives”, this occurring on one and the same page of the volume. This may lead to misunderstand-
ing since “the House of Representatives” is the regular name of the lower house of American Congress. The 
reader therefore may be misled and think that in the USA… the Senate has the right to apply a suspending 
veto with respect to the bills adopted by the House of Representatives (cf. p. 34). An obvious mistake is also 
detectable in the title of the subchapter which mentions 1788 as the date of the adoption of the Constitution 
of 3rd May! (p. 29).
8  Cf. footnote no. 2.
9  Also the 3rd May Constitution was classifi ed into a superior rank category. Its preambule proclaimed 
that “we declare that this Constitution be considered saint and fi rm until the nation, within law-specifi ed 
period of time, should not regard it as advisable to change any of its Articles”. According to the law on the 
extraordinary constitutional Seym the latter was expected to be convened every 25 years in order to revise the 
A New Image of the History of the European Constitutionalism...
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The essence of the late 18th century Republic’s constitutional problem lay in the fun-
damental revaluation  of the constitutional foundations of the liberty-based paradigm of 
the Nobiliary Republic. It was no longer the free election of the monarch and the liberum 
veto that were expected to make up the catalogue of cardinal laws but the direct opposite 
of the aforementioned principles, and namely the hereditary monarchy and the voting by 
majority in the Seym. The 3rd May Constitution was designed to override the old con-
stitutional system in order to rescue the State from losing its independence. “Restoring 
the government” was believed to be the most eff ective measure safeguarding “the true 
freedom and entirety of Poland” – these were the lines contained in the Declaration pro-
duced by the Seym after the Constitution was adopted.10 The principle of superiority of 
the Constitution was designed to put a stop to the attempts at returning to the previous 
constitutional system. It was feared  that the opponents of the Constitution might try to 
dismantle it. The Seym therefore tried to take every passible means to secure a durability 
of the adopted Constitution. In order to achieve that the Seym resorted both to the legal 
constructions as well as to penal measures. To the group of legal principles the objec-
tive of which was prevent the restoring of the old constitutional system there belonged 
the principle of superiority of the Constitution articulated in its preamble as well as the 
preventive procedure designed to control the constitutionality of the projects of laws and 
applied by the Seym Deputation.11 In the aforementioned Declaration of the assembled 
estates the Seym again emphasized  that all “old and present day laws that contradict the 
Constitution” were abolished.12 The Seym simultaneously adopted a position that the one 
who would dare publicly criticize the Constitution or would tend toward its overthrow-
ing should be recognized as “an enemy to the motherland” and punished by the Seym 
Court in the most severe manner.
The 3rd May Constitution created an original form of political system that on one 
hand was deeply rooted in the republican tradition of the old-time Poland but, on the 
other hand, it also corresponded to the theories on the sovereignty of the nation popular 
in the era of Enlightenment. It may be believed that only to same extent the system thus 
introduced resulted from something like conscious imitation. But it is more probable that 
provisions of the Constitution. Cf. Volumina Legum (hereinafter VL), vol. IX, Kraków, published by Akade-
mia Umiejętności, 1889, p. 241.
10  Cf. ibidem, p. 225.
11  The law on the Seyms of 1791 provided for the forming of the Seym Deputation whose task would be 
“to see to it that no project of law should tend toward infringement of the Constitution and the fi rm cardinal 
laws”. Among the tasks with which the Deputation was charged there was the introductory (preventive) con-
trol of constitutionality of the project that could be fi led by every deputy. If the project contained the provi-
sions  that infringed the constitutional principles the Deputation called on the author of the project to modify it 
or to drop it. If the author of the project did not do that the project was submitted to the session of the House of 
the Deputies with the remarks made on it by the Deputation. It was the Deputation composed of 13 members 
which decided whether the project was inconsistent with the Constitution. They did it by majority vote. Thus 
the Deputation performed the function of the Seym-sponsored constitutional tribunal. The position adopted 
by the Deputation was morally but not legally binding on the deputies sitting in the lower house. If however 
the project of the law infringed the basic civic rights of an individual it was ignored by the Deputation and 
could not make up a subject matter of the sessions of the ordinary Seym. The point is that the change of the 
fi rm cardinal laws was exclusively within the competence of the Constitutional Seym that was expected to be 
convened every 25 years. Cf. VL, vol. IX, p. 258.
12  Cf. ibidem, p. 225.
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concurrent ideas came to being independently of one another. Such refl ection appears 
when we confront the constitutional thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyés, the confrontation being made in the reviewed volume. The diff erence of 
views presented by the French thinkers naturally made up the background of the Polish 
constitutional discourse. In the Polish constitutional model the trace of the Sieyés’ politi-
cal doctrine seems to be particularly perceptible.13
Similarities refer both to the question of identifying the sovereign power of the na-
tion with the idea of political representation as well as to the distinction between the 
constituent power and constituted (i.e. legislative) power. It was in a surprising way 
that the Sieyés ideas converged  with the Polish constitutional practice. From the point 
of view of Sieyés the nation and its will preceded the Constitution in this sense that the 
nation was not bound by it and could change the Constitution. However, the legislative 
power and the positive law were subject to the Constitution. Thus the legislative power 
could not change the Constitution. In this sense the Constitution was a fundamental law. 
What was obvious for Sieyés’ was that executive power derived its legitimation from 
the Constitution.14 There is no doubt therefore that the Polish constitutional experiment 
of the end of the 18th century was closer to the image of sovereign power as conceived 
of by Sieyés’ than to that conceived of by J.J. Rousseau although the thought of the lat-
ter had a direct relationship with the assessment of the constitutional system of the old 
Nobiliary Republic. 
In compliance with the chronological course of events but also in compliance with 
the ReConFort research plan, the next fragment of the volume was devoted to the dis-
cussion of sovereignty of nation in the Cadiz Constitution of 1812. Unlike in case of the 
Polish, Belgian or Italian Constitutions, in case of Spanish Constitution there appeared – 
apart from what U. Müßig wrote in her sketch – no separate analysis. This seems to be to 
the detriment of the complex review of the European Constitutions. A too synthetic look 
upon to Spanish debate that was concerned with the sovereignty of the nation naturally 
limited the presentation of the stance on the problem as adopted by all important partici-
pants in the debate, and particularly those who defended the old order. The Spanish Cadiz 
Constitution deserved more complex elaboration due to its liberal dimension (Art. 4
and Art. 13) and due to the fact that it expressis verbis (Art. 3) defi ned sovereignty of the 
nation as the right of the nation to adopt fundamental laws (leyes fundamentals). 
13  Emmanuel-Joseph  Sieyés’ political activities were well known in Poland. His brochures were printed 
and distributed. Cf. E.J. Sieyés, Czym jest stan trzeci? Esej o przywilejach, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsza-
wa 2016, p. 5.
14  R. Kubben, Parliament and Pamphlet: Sieyesʼ Quʼest-ce que le tiers état? And the Missing link 
between Medieval and Modern constitutionalism [in:] Parliaments: The Law, the Practice and the Repre-
sentations: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day, eds. M.H. de Cruz Coelho, M.M. Tavares Ribeiro, 
Lisbon 2010, p. 395. The ground for the ideological concurrence of Sieyés’ views and those contained  in the 
constitutional project of the 3rd May Constitution could be provided by the principle  of fundamental laws of 
monarchy as detectable in the pre-revolutionary France. This principle  would resemble the Polish principle 
of cardinal laws. Irrespective of political consequences of the two constitutional principles what they had in 
common was the idea that their original source lay in the Canon law concept, the concept which proclaimed 
that the one who exercised power was bound by law. In a similar way the Spanish concept of leyes fundamen-
tales – understood as the order that is superior to the rights of the legislator and that functions as the source 
which legitimizes executive power – grew out of the Catholic concept of natural rights worked out by the 
scholastics of Salamanca.
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One should share the view adopted by the authoress according to which Art. 3 of the 
Spanish Constitution does not amount to the rejection of the monarchy but only points 
to what is a constituent power in the state. These remarks should however be supple-
mented with the observation that such interpretation was alien to the opponents of the 
new Constitution. According to the lines written by one of them (Miguel de Lardizabal 
y Uribe) to proclaim the sovereignty of the nation and introduce republic or democracy 
amounts to one and the same. While following what has been established by the lit-
erature on the subject, the authoress presents the secularised concept of sovereignty of 
authorities as developed by the scholastics of Salamanca who recognized the secular and 
not divine origin of monarchical power. They thought that the sovereign power derives 
from God and passes on to the King by means of the people in whom the sovereign 
power resides primarily and essentially. Sovereign power as a source of human power 
was therefore derivative of the power disposed of by the community as such.15
The scholastic concept of the nation viewed as the body that wields sovereign power 
was repeatedly invoked by the liberal representatives of the Cortes when they polemized 
with the conservative camp. One of these representatives, while answering his adversary, 
posed a rhetoric question: “If sovereignty belonged exclusively to the King of Spain 
what right would the Cortes dispose of in order to limit the monarchical power?” (Diego 
Muñioz Torrero). The quotation that the authoress selected was well refl ective of the es-
sence of the Spanish controversy over a sovereign power in the constitutional state. Like 
– earlier – the constitutional system of the Nobiliary Republic of Poland-Lithuania, thus 
also the Spanish Constitution of 1812 safeguarded the power of the nation by recogniz-
ing the superior position of the Cortes in the constitutional system. However, in its solu-
tions the Spanish Constitution did not go as far as the Polish Constitution did since it did 
not introduce political, but only constitutional (i.e. penal) responsibility of ministers.16
Unlike in Poland, in Spain the legislative power was exercised by the Cortes together 
with the King. In this case the Spanish solution was refl ective of the Spanish tradition 
of the King co-operating with the nation in the law-creating process.17 What however 
the King was entitled to was only the suspending veto with respect to the laws adopted 
by the Cortes. According to the Cadiz Constitution of 19th March 1812 the person of the 
King was saint, untouchable and could not be brought to accountability (Art. 168). All 
the acts that the King issued required the countersignature (endorsement) as made by 
the Secretary of State. Otherwise they were not eff ective. Like in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Nobiliary Republic, thus also in Spain the sovereign nation, by requiring ministerial 
countersignature on royal acts, safeguarded itself against the personal rule of the mon-
arch. As an organ of the executive power the monarch acted through his ministers who 
were responsible to parliament for the offi  cial acts of the King. It was a typical feature 
15  M. Müller, The Notion of Sovereignty in the Constitutional Process of Cádiz (1810–1812), “Jus Fugit” 
2016, no. 19, p. 194ff .
16  The authoress wrongly assumes that Art. 226 of the Constitution made the ministers politically re-
sponsible. The contents of the provision distinctly shows that it was their constitutional (penal) responsibility 
that came into play. Also Art.134 item 25 referred to penal, and not political responsibility.
17  M. Müller, The Notion…,  p. 194. In Poland the fear that the King who inherits the throne may intro-
duce the personal type of rule which would limit the position of the Seym, decided on depriving the monarch 
of his share in the law-creating process although previously he had such share. 
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of the juridifi cation of  sovereignty of the nation in the European constitutionalism. It 
consisted in the limiting – through the Constitution – of the executive power of the King. 
The King was expected to rule while assisted by his ministers who were constitutionally 
responsible to parliament. 
In further part of her study U. Müßig devoted a considerable attention to the Norwegian 
Constitution although the latter was omitted in the ReConFort project. This Constitution 
arose the interest of the authoress since the Norwegian Grunnloven of 1814 made up an 
excellent example of how the dispute between the parliament and the King over the in-
terpretation of the provisions of the Constitution could change the constitutional system 
of the state. The Norwegian experience shows in the most distinct way that the constitu-
tionalism should be also viewed from the perspective of constitutional practice. Without 
that perspective the image of the historically shaped constitutionalism may be found to 
be incomplete. Despite the fact that the Norwegian constitutional dispute referred to the 
issue of secondary importance, i.e. to the question of the participation of ministers in 
parliamentary sessions, it in fact turned into a long-lasting struggle for deciding to whom 
there belonged the sovereign state power: to the parliament or to the King. 
What should be found to be an interesting underplot in the discussion was the analy-
sis of the legal opinion drawn up by the professors of law in Christiani (Oslo) in 1880. In 
their legal argumentation the research representatives, while acknowledging the King’s 
right to veto the parliamentary law if the latter changed the Constitution, took into con-
sideration both the superiority of the Constitution as well as the distinction between the 
constituent and the legislative power. Through this contrasting of the two functions per-
formed by the representative of the nation there resulted the conclusion that ordinary leg-
islator had no right to change the Constitution. This meant that only monarch’s absolute 
veto as imposed on the law which tended to change the Constitution could prevent the 
legislative from exceeding its constitutional function. The point is that the Constitution 
provided only for the King’s suspending veto that could be applied to ordinary laws 
adopted by parliament. The parliament eventually forced through the interpretation of 
the Constitution which was advantageous to it, thereby forcing the King to give consent 
to parliamentary responsibility of ministers. One may only raise a doubt whether 1884 
should really be considered to be the date of emergence of parliamentarism in Norway. 
The doubt is due in the fact that King Oskar II exercised his power by personal rule and 
ignored the lay-out of political forces in parliament. 
After an interesting divagation on the forming of Norwegian constitutionalism the au-
thoress passed on to the making of general remarks on the forming and on the content of 
the Belgian Constitution of 1831 and on the Statuto Albertino of 1848. While producing 
her general assessment of the Belgian Constitution, the authoress is found to be caution 
in expressing a fi rm opinion suggesting that in Belgium there existed from beginning 
classical parliamentary monarchy. It is true that due to the constitutional custom there 
developed in this country the parliamentary responsibility of ministers but Belgium was 
far from introducing the principle that “the King reigns but does not rule”. On should 
share the authoress’ opinion about the ministers in Belgium being subject to double 
responsibility. Apart from being supported by the parliament they had to be trusted by 
the King. When the monarch lost his confi dence in them they had to resign their posts. 
The authoress is also right when she treats the evolution of the Statuto Albertino toward 
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parliamentary system of government as a case study of the process of juridifi cation of 
sovereignty by means of the Constitution.
The synthetic image of the both Constitutions was supplemented by a deep insight 
made into the Belgian and Italian constitutional discourse. Particularly thorough and 
source-based analysis of the origin of Art. 25 of the Belgian Constitution was made by 
Brecht Deseure in his publication National Sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 
1831: On the Meaning(s) of Article 25. This Article anchored the entire state power in 
the sovereignty of the nation without defi ning the sovereign. The Constitution provided 
that these were exclusively the members of parliament who were the representatives of 
the nation. The principle of monarchical government was rejected in Art. 78. The King 
had no other powers then those formally attributed to him by the Constitution and by 
ordinary laws established under the Constitution. The analysis of press articles and the 
speeches delivered by the members of National Congress as well as the study of views 
expressed by legal doctrine, allowed the author to arrive at a conclusion that the notions 
“people” and the “nation” meant the same in the Belgian debate. The parliament that 
controlled the activities of the King by bringing to accountability the constitutional min-
ister was – in the course of time – capable of imposing upon the King the duty to appoint 
ministers who were trusted by the representative of the nation. Thus we may say that on 
one hand the Belgian Constitution created in its provisions the premises for forming, 
by way of custom, parliamentary responsibility of ministers, yet on the other hand the 
King’s veto vis-a-vis the parliament-adopted laws and the magistracies who were subject 
to the monarch, allowed him to preserve a part of state niveau under his control.
While the discussion of the Belgian Constitution, drew the attention of the reader 
to a larger extent on the doctrinal approach toward the sovereignty of the nation, the 
presentation of the Albertine Statute of 1848 seemed to be more dynamic. In his publica-
tion The Omnipotence of Parliament in the Legitimisation Process of ‘Representative 
Government’ under the Albertine Statute (1848–1861) Giuseppe Mecca demonstrates 
the Italian constitutional document of 1848 within a longer period of development. He 
combines the purely constitutional elements, those that contain the analysis of provi-
sions, with political events that aff ected the constitutional practice. What he particularly 
subjects to assessment is the defi ning of the constitutional system as “representative gov-
ernment” (Art. 2, St.Alb. ). The author emphasizes that although the Albertine Statute, 
which was authoritatively granted by the monarch, was modelled upon the French 
Constitutional Charter of 1814, it nevertheless conceived of the monarchical principle in 
its own diff erent way since it accepted the principle that the power derived from the will 
of the nation. While invoking the views of publicism and those of research of his time, 
the author drew the attention of the reader to the fact that the theory of the “omnipotence 
of Parliament” was a corrective between the monarchical principle and the excesses of 
popular sovereignty. This theory made up also the basis for the elaborating of parliamen-
tary system.
The reviewed monograph deserves the attention of both legal historians as well as 
constitutionalists since it deals with the forming of European constitutionalism on the 
three levels: the doctrinal, the historical and the comparative. The principle of national 
sovereignty was therefore the most important factor in the formation of the European 
constitutionalism and parliamentarism. The description of the process of juridifi cation of 
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sovereignty of the nation that was presented in the discussed volume on the basis of the 
Polish, Spanish, Belgian and Italian constitutional models considerably broadened the 
research fi eld to be exploited by those interested in the origins of the European constitu-
tional experience, both that of permanent as well as of ephemeral nature. This experience 
makes up a common tradition refl ective of the European constitutional pattern which in 
the present-day Europe is referred to as the “state of law” (Rechtsstaat).
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